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Abstract When elementary quantum systems, such as
polarized photons, are used to transmit digital information,
the uncertainty principle gives rise to novel cryptographic
phenomena unachievable with traditional transmission
media, e.g. a communications channel on which it is
impossible in principle to eavesdrop without a high prob-
ability of being detected. With such a channel, a one-time
pad can safely be reused many times as long as no
eavesdrop is detected, and, planning ahead, part of the
capacity of these uncompromised transmissions can be
used to send fresh random bits with which to replace the
one-time pad when an eavesdrop finally is detected. Unlike
other schemes for stretching a one-time pad, this scheme
does not depend on complexity-theoretic assumptions such
as the difficulty of factoring.
1 Introduction
In conventional information theory and cryptography, it is
taken for granted that a digital message can always be
copied easily, even by someone ignorant of its meaning.
Analog messages (e.g. handwritten signatures) are some-
what harder to copy, but not really infeasible, and digital
data can be protected to a considerable extent by inter-
posing a restrictive hardware interface between the data
and the outside world (e.g. smart credit cards); but in both
these cases, the difficulty of copying is only technological,
not fundamental. However, when elementary quantum
systems such as polarized photons are used as the trans-
mission medium, routine copying of messages is no longer
possible even in principle. In particular, there are ways of
encoding messages so that they can be copied reliably only
with the help of certain key information used in forming
the message.
Quantum coding was first described in [W], along with
two applications: making money that is in principle
impossible to counterfeit, and multiplexing two or three
messages in such a way that only one can be read. More
recently [BBBW], quantum coding has been used in con-
junction with public key cryptographic techniques to yield
several schemes for unforgeable subway tokens. Here we
show that quantum coding considerably enhances the
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usefulness of another standard cryptographic device, the
one-time pad.
Mathematically, a polarized photon acts like a two-bit
read-once memory one of whose bits (k) serves as a read key
for the other (m). Querying the memory with the correct
k yields the correct value of m. Querying with the wrong
k yields a random bit instead of m, and in either case que-
rying resets the memory so that subsequent queries yield no
new information. Even after a query, it is generally impos-
sible to infer the initial state of either bit, because the
memory gives no indication of whether its response was the
correct response to the correct key or a random response to
the wrong key. Because it represents the behavior of an
elementary quantum system, this kind of restricted-access
memory should be thought of as a natural information-pro-
cessing primitive, not as a complex technological device that
could probably be circumvented in principle.
Ordinarily, when one thinks of a technological restric-
ted-access memory, one has in mind an information-stor-
age device. Photons can also be stored (e.g. between
mirrors, or in a closed optical fiber), but they cannot in
practice be stored for very long, and their natural appli-
cation is in the transmission of information. We thus have a
situation in which restricted-access memory, as a storage
device, is possible in practice but not in principle via
conventional technology, and in principle but not in prac-
tice via storage of polarized photons. On the other hand,
restricted-access transmissions, which can be read or cop-
ied only with the help of a key, are possible both in prin-
ciple and in practice using polarized photons.
2 Essential Properties of Polarized Photons
Polarized light can be produced by sending ordinary light
through a polarizing apparatus such as a Polaroid filter or
Nicol prism. A beam of polarized light is characterized by
its polarization axis, which is determined by the orientation
of the polarizing apparatus in which the beam originates.
Although polarization is a continuous variable, and in
principle can be measured as accurately as desired by
passing the polarized beam through a second polarizing
apparatus, the uncertainty principle forbids measurements
on any single photon from revealing more than one bit
about the beam’s polarization. In particular, if a beam
with polarization axis a is sent into a polarizer oriented
at angle b, the individual photons behave dichotomously
and probabilistically, being transmitted with probability
cos2ða bÞ and absorbed with the complementary proba-
bility sin2ða bÞ. The photons behave deterministically
only when the two axes are parallel (certain transmission)
or perpendicular (certain absorption).
If the two axes are not perpendicular, so that some
photons are transmitted, one might hope to learn additional
information about a by measuring the transmitted photons
again with a polarizer oriented at some third angle; but this
is to no avail, because the transmitted photons, in passing
through the b polarizer, emerge with exactly b polarization,
having lost all memory of their previous polarization a.
Any other elementary two-state quantum system, such as
a spin-1/2 atom, behaves similarly dichotomously and
probabilistically.
Another way one might hope to learn more than one bit
from a single photon would be not to measure it directly,
but rather somehow amplify it into a clone of identically
polarized photons, then perform measurements on these;
but this hope is also vain, because such cloning can be
shown to be inconsistent with the foundations of quantum
mechanics [WZ].
3 Quantum Coding
In order to encode a message bit m into a photon that can
be read or copied reliably only with the help of a key bit k,
we generate a photon with a selected one of the four
polarization directions 0, 45, 90 and 135 degrees. [Gener-
ating a single photon of known polarization is possible by
variation of the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen setup [Bo], in
which a decaying atom emits two oppositely polarized
photons. By polarizing and counting one photon, the oth-
er’s presence is assured and its polarization fixed without
measuring it directly.] If the key bit is a 0, then the photon
is polarized rectilinearly, i.e. 0 or 90 degrees according to
whether the message bit is 0 or 1. If the key bit is a 1, then
the photon is polarized diagonally, i.e. 45 or 135 degrees
according to the message bit.
Def. The quantum encoding QKðMÞ of a message M by a
key K of equal length is the train of photons obtained by
applying the above procedure bitwise to M and K.
To read a quantum-encoded message with the help of its
key, one simply reads each photon with a polarizer oriented
so as to cause it to behave deterministically, for example,
reading the rectilinear photons with a 0-degree polarizer
and the diagonal photons with a 45-degree polarizer. An
attempt to read a photon with the wrong key causes it to
behave randomly, losing its stored information. For
example, if a 45- or 135-degree photon is read with a
0-degree polarizer, it will be transmitted with 50 per cent
probability in either case, and all evidence of its original
polarization will be lost.
Suppose an eavesdropper intercepts and attempts to read
a quantum transmission QKðMÞ without being detected.
Consider first the case in which the message M and key K
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are both random. Not knowing K, the eavesdropper makes
the wrong measurement on half the photons, and thus
obtains a message M0 differing from M in 1/4 of its bit
positions (of course the eavesdropper does not know which
ones). Having destroyed the original transmission by
reading it, the eavesdropper must now, in order to remain
undetected, inject a forged transmission designed to
approximate the intercepted one as well as possible. Not
knowing which measurements are wrong, the eavesdrop-
per’s best strategy is to produce a new train of photons in
agreement with the results of the measurements, as if they
had all been right. Half of the photons in such a forged
transmission will be correct; the other half have wrong key
values (i.e. will be diagonal when they should be rectilin-
ear, or vice versa), and when subsequently measured with
the correct key by the intended receiver, these will give
wrong answers half the time. Thus the error probability is
1/4 per bit, both for reading the quantum transmission
without knowing its key, and for having a forged replace-
ment agree with what the original message would have said
when decoded by the intended receiver. Of course, if the
intended receiver knew only K but had no prior knowledge
of M, the eavesdropping would still1 go undetected, since a
random message with random errors still looks random.
Quantum money [W] corresponds to the case where the
intended receiver (the bank) has perfect knowledge of both
M and K, while the counterfeiter knows neither. The usual
message M sent over communication channels is interme-
diate between these extremes: the receiver has partial prior
knowledge of it (e.g. expecting it to be in English).
Simply encoding an arbitrary message M with a random
quantum key K has two disadvantages: 1) if the message is
too random the receiver won’t be able to detect eaves-
dropping, for the reason mentioned above; 2) if the mes-
sage is too redundant (e.g. English), eavesdropping will be
detected, but by then the eavesdropper will have gained
significant information about the message, perhaps even
enough to decrypt it uniquely, because eavesdropping
induces errors in only 1/4 of the bits. (In this respect
quantum coding differs from ordinary one-time pad
encryption, where ignorance of the key prevents the
eavesdropper from learning anything about the encrypted
message,2 though of course it can be freely copied.)
We now define a stronger kind of coding that overcomes
both these disadvantages. The trick is to make the message
redundant with an error-detecting code M ! EðMÞ, then
hide the redundancy from the eavesdropper by an ordinary
one-time pad J, before applying quantum coding.
Def. For any error-detecting code E (assumed known to
the eavesdropper) let the strong quantum code SE be
defined as follows: let J and K be two random key strings
of length jEðMÞj not known to the eavesdropper.3 Then the
strong quantum encoding SEJ;KðMÞ of message M is the
train of photons QkðJ xor EðMÞÞ.
It is obvious (because of the one-time pad J ) that the
eavesdropper can learn nothing about M from SEJ;KðMÞ.
Moreover, for suitable error-correcting codes,4 eavesdrop-
ping incurs a high risk of being detected. Even the rudi-
mentary code of repeating the message twice EðMÞ ¼ MM
suffices to detect eavesdropping with probability at least
1  0:79k when k photons have been intercepted, quite
close to the optimum 1  0:75k implied by the indepen-
dent, probabilistic nature of eavesdropping-induced errors.
Although the simple code EðMÞ ¼ MM is nearly optimal
for eavesdropping-detection, a more complex code would
be preferable for another reason: the detection of deliberate
message alteration. Although randomly quantum-coded
photons cannot be read reliably, they can be altered reliably.
For example, the polarization axis of a photon can be
rotated by 90 degrees, without measuring or otherwise
disturbing it, by passing the photon through an appropriate
sequence of mirrors (or, more mysteriously, through a sugar
solution). If this manipulation were applied to the first and
ðn þ 1Þst photons of a 2n-photon transmission coded as
above, both would be altered with certainty in such a way as
to induce an undetected alteration in the message. A more
complex error-detecting code, e.g. concatenating MM with
a check sum of the addresses of the ones in M, would make
such alterations unlikely to escape detection. In the next
section, where quantum transmissions are used to carry key
information for future transmissions, it will be necessary to
use an error-correcting code5 that provides some ‘diffu-
sion’, in the sense of making each bit of EðMÞ depend on
many bits of M. This prevents the eavesdropper who has
luckily guessed a few bits of the present key from thereby
efficiently inferring any bits of future keys. Finally, in1 This word (‘‘still’’) appears to be superfluous. The authors do not
understand in 2014 what they could have meant by it when they wrote
the original 1982 manuscript.
2 In 2014, the authors realize that the phrase ‘‘the encrypted
message’’ was ambiguous and confusing. They intended it to mean
‘‘the message whose meaning had been concealed by encryption’’—
i.e. the plaintext—rather than what would nowadays be seen as its
more likely meaning in a cryptologic context, ‘‘the message in
encrypted form’’—i.e. the ciphertext. Eavesdropping on a classical
one-time pad transmission of course yields complete information on
the ciphertext but none on the plaintext.
3 In 2014, the authors noticed a possible ambiguity in this sentence.
It is the random key strings J and K that are unknown to the
eavesdropper, not their length jEðMÞj.
4 In 2014, the authors noticed that they had meant ‘‘error-detecting
codes’’ here.
5 In 2014, the authors noticed that they had meant ‘‘error-detecting
code’’ here as well.
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section 5, we will need a code E that corrects errors as well
as detecting them, to make up for photons that arrive at the
receiver but fail to be detected.
4 Reusing a One-Time Pad Safely with the Help
of Quantum Coding
We consider a situation in which two users of an insecure
communications channel, who initially share a finite secret
key, wish to communicate secretly as long as they can. In a
classical setting, where eavesdropping is undetectable in
principle, they must assume that all their communications
are being listened to, and the volume of safe communication
is only linear in the size of the key, unless they resort to
pseudorandom key-expansion schemes [BM,Y], which are
at best (assuming P 6¼ NP) only computationally secure.
We show that by strongly quantum-coding their mes-
sages with suitable error-detecting codes, the sender and
receiver can safely reuse the same J and K keys indefinitely
until an eavesdrop is detected. (The safety is not absolute.
There is an exponentially small chance (Oð2jKjÞ) that the
eavesdropper, having guessed the entire quantum key K
correctly, will be able to eavesdrop on all the transmissions
without detection and go on to break the reused J key in the
usual manner, as well as a moderate chance for the
eavesdropper to learn a few bits of the K key correctly and
go on to intercept and decrypt a few bits of each message;
but these risks do not increase with the number of times an
apparently secure key is reused.) An eavesdropper who
tampers with or suppresses messages will also be detected
with high probability, as will one who injects false
messages.
When an eavesdrop is detected, the sender and receiver
can go on communicating with only slightly diminished
safety by replacing their compromised keys by fresh random
information sent over the channel in previous uncompro-
mised transmissions. With high probability they will be able
to continue communicating in this fashion for an exponential
(2OðjKjÞ) number of key changes,6 unless the eavesdrops
become so frequent before then that they are forced to use
up key information faster than they can replace it, in which
case they will (with high probability) be able to cease
communication before any of their transmissions have
become uniquely decodable by the eavesdropper.
Because the replacement keys are truly random, rather
than being pseudorandomly computed from an original
seed, the security of the scheme would not be reduced by
allowing the eavesdropper unlimited computing power.
Neither would it be compromised by technological
improvements in the art of eavesdropping. The scheme
does incorporate one technologically unrealistic assump-
tion, viz. that photons can be detected with perfect effi-
ciency (cf. section 5, where this assumption is not made).
We sketch how these advantages can be achieved. The
ability to send many messages without loss of security
(when no eavesdropping is detected) follows from the
exponential decline of the probability of escaping detection
with the number of distinct bit positions ever subjected to
eavesdropping, whether these bit positions are listened to
all at once, or a few at a time over the course of many
transmissions. For this reason, a quantum channel could
even be used to safely send arbitrarily many copies of the
same strongly coded transmission, without the eavesdrop-
per being able to forge it accurately, provided the copies
were sent one at a time, each only on confirmation that the
preceding one had apparently not been listened to. By
contrast, if many identical transmissions were sent all at
once, the eavesdropper could intercept them all, reliably
determine each polarization by multiple measurements,
and then escape detection by forging many trains of pho-
tons with the now known sequence of polarizations.
In order to be sure that no key is reused after a detected
eavesdropping, the two communicating parties must alter-
nate strictly in their use of each key. Otherwise the
eavesdropper could, for example, intercept and absorb a
message from A without forwarding it to B and then wait
for B to use the same key on a subsequent message. The
effect of absorbing a message is thus the same as that of
spoiling it through eavesdropping: neither party reuses the
key with which it was sent. If the initial body of shared
key information included several keys reserved for first use
by A and several for first use by B, the parties could
alternate in the use of each key without strictly alternating
transmissions. Of course if multiple keys were in use, and
particularly if some transmissions were being absorbed by
the eavesdropper, the communicating parties would have to
prefix each quantum transmission by a (cleartext) indica-
tion of which key it was encoded with, to avoid reading a
message with the wrong quantum key and spoiling it.
The ability to change keys without serious loss of
security depends on using a somewhat diffusive error-
detecting code when new key information is transmitted.
With the simple non-diffusive code EðMÞ ¼ MM, an
eavesdropper who by good luck has correctly guessed the
first and ðn þ 1Þst bits of the current J and K keys will
know what measurements to make to reliably read and
forge the corresponding bits of a fresh pair of random keys
J0, K 0 when these are sent through the channel in four
transmissions strongly encoded by J and K; as well as
confirming, by the consistency of decoding of the error-
6 Note added in 2014: this 1982 use of the asymptotic notation ‘‘O’’
was an example of the common physics usage, where it may mean
either an upper or lower bound depending on context. Here, we
intended a lower bound, which in modern computer science usage
would be denoted 2XðjKjÞ.
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detecting code, that the guessed bits of J and K are indeed
correct. Subsequent lucky guessing on further generations
of keys (along with unlucky guessing causing some keys to
be rejected due to detected eavesdropping) could be used to
discover additional bits until, in linear time, some pair of
keys J00 and K 00 became entirely known.
To delay this collapse for an expected exponential num-
ber7 of key changes 2OðnÞ, it suffices to use an error-
detecting code that diffuses information about each bit of its
argument M among many bits of its value EðMÞ; so that
knowledge, say, of any n=4 bits of EðMÞ reveals little or
nothing about any bit of M. Many error-detecting codes
have this property, e.g. a random mapping from n-bit strings
to 2n-bit strings, or the linear code obtained by mod-2
multiplying MM by an appropriate nonsingular matrix. With
a diffusive code, knowledge of a few bits of J and K would
not enable the eavesdropper to make reliable measurements
of any bits of the replacement keys J0 and K 0.
5 A Practical Implementation
Although visible light photons can be polarized with nearly
perfect efficiency (e.g. a Nicol prism can split a beam into
two beams, very nearly perfectly polarized at right angles
to each other, whose total intensity is scarcely less than that
of the incoming beam), and transmitted with nearly perfect
efficiency (in a vacuum the only significant losses are due
to diffraction, and these can be made negligible by using a
beam diameter considerably greater than the square root of
the product of the transmission distance and the wave-
length of light), current technology allows them to be
detected with only about thirty per cent efficiency.8
Fortunately, the scheme of the preceding section can be
modified to accommodate finite detector efficiency, at the
cost of using a more complicated error-correcting code
M ! EðMÞ in place of the error-detecting code, and a more
complicated criterion for key rejection than the detection of
a single error on decoding EðMÞ. Somewhat surprisingly,
the modified scheme remains secure against an eaves-
dropper with a more efficient, or even perfectly efficient,
photon detector. The volume of safe communication for
this scheme is more than linear, but may be less than
exponential, in the initial key size.
The main modification is to use standard faint pulses of
polarized light instead of single photons, each pulse being
of such a size that when it is sent into a detector of the
given efficiency (e.g. 30 per cent), or split into several
fainter pulses (e.g. by a half-silvered mirror or a Nicol
prism) and sent into several such detectors, the total
number of photons detected obeys a Poisson distribution of
mean 1. Such a standard faint pulse can easily be produced
by filtering a standard bright pulse of polarized light to
reduce its intensity by the requisite constant factor.
A standard faint pulse of a given polarization resists
copying nearly as well as a single photon would. The best
strategy for an eavesdropper to copy a faint pulse is to use a
half silvered mirror and two Nicol prisms to split the incoming
pulse into four beams, one of each canonical polarization, and
monitor each beam by a photon detector. Most of the time,
only one of the detectors will register a photon, and the
eavesdropper will be no better off than in the single photon
case. Occasionally two or three detectors will register, yield-
ing more information. Only when three detectors register will
the pulse’s polarization be known unambiguously (e.g. if
both diagonal detectors and the vertical detector register, then
the pulse must have been vertically polarized). The faint pulse
works well because the chance of three detectors responding
to the same pulse is only about 2 per cent (for a Poisson
distribution of mean*1). The other 98 per cent of the time, the
eavesdropper does not learn the pulse’s polarization unam-
biguously, and, as with single photons, cannot reliably copy it.
Even a technologically advanced eavesdropper, with perfectly
efficient photon detectors, could not copy faint pulses reliably.
For example, if the advanced eavesdropper uses 100 per cent
detectors to analyze a pulse intended for 30 per cent detectors,
an average of 3.3 photons will be detected per pulse, but the
chance that these will appear in three different beams, and thus
reveal the pulse’s polarization unambiguously, would still be
only about 25 per cent.
The converse phenomenon, namely statistical failure to
detect even one photon when a pulse arrives, requires that
the rejection test be made more complicated. Even if a
transmission is not subjected to eavesdropping, about 1=e
of its light pulses go undetected, due to normal bad luck at
the detectors. The rejection test must begin by deciding
whether the number of missing light pulses is so great as to
raise the suspicion of eavesdropping (a wise eavesdropper
now might not bother to forge replacements for the inter-
cepted pulses, but instead let them remain missing, hoping
to pass them off as pulses that arrived but were not
detected). If the number of missing pulses is not too great,
the error-correcting code must reliably restore the data they
would have carried, as well as checking for polarization
errors, which as before would indicate interception and
forgery of some of the pulses. A convolutional code [G]
appears most suitable for achieving the desired high effi-
ciency of error-correction in a channel with a large number
of erasures (1=e). Depending on the purity of polarization
available from the Nicol prisms, the code could be made to
7 Note added in 2014: as in the previous footnote, modern computer
science usage would have us write an expected 2XðnÞ number of key
changes.
8 Note added in 2014: this was the approximate quantum efficiency
of photomultiplier tubes available in 1982.
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tolerate and correct a small number of polarization errors,
but reject a larger number as evidence of forgery. Since the
capacity of a binary channel with 1=e erasure probability is
0.632, a four-fold expansion in EðMÞ offers ample room for
efficient error detection and correction. This in turn means
that eight transmissions, each containing n fresh key bits,
would have to be accepted to replace the 8n bits sacrificed
in a rejection.
The most problematical aspect of the modified scheme is
the decision of when to reject a transmission and change
keys. By contrast with the scheme of the previous section,
it is now necessary to change keys periodically (at least
every n1=2 transmissions) even in the absence of any evi-
dence of eavesdropping, in order to prevent an eaves-
dropper from intercepting all of the bit positions, a few at a
time, over the course of many apparently safe transmis-
sions. The expected number of safe key changes has not
been worked out, but it is not implausible that it is still
exponential in the key size.9
Acknowledgments We wish to thank Stephen Wiesner for numer-
ous helpful discussions of quantum theory, John Denker for drawing
our attention to the analogy between choice of basis (e.g. rectilinear
vs. diagonal) and a cryptographic key, Andrew Greenberg for point-
ing out that photons in flight could be used to test a channel for
eavesdropping, and Lalit Bahl for advice on error-correcting codes.10
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the
Creative Commons Attribution License which permits any use, dis-
tribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original
author(s) and the source are credited.
References
[BBBW] C. H. Bennett, G. Brassard, S. Breidbart, and S. Wiesner,
‘‘Quantum Cryptography, or Unforgeable Subway Tokens’’,
to appear in Advances in Cryptography: Proceedings of
CRYPTO 82, Plenum Press. [These CRYPTO 82 Proceed-
ings were published in 1983 and this paper was on pages
267–275.]
[BM] M. Blum and S. Micali, ‘‘How to Generate Cryptograph-
ically Strong Sequences of Pseudo Random Bits’’, 23rd
IEEE-FOCS, 112–117 (1982).
[Bo] D. Bohm, Quantum Theory (Prentice-Hall, Englewood
Cliffs, New Jersey, 1951), 614–619.
[G] R. G. Gallager, Information Theory and Reliable Commu-
nication (Wiley, New York, 1968), 258–280.
[W] S. Wiesner, ‘‘Conjugate Coding’’, unpublished manuscript
(ca. 1970). [This seminal work, actually written in 1968,
was eventually published in ACM Sigact News 15(1):78–88
(1983) in the wake of [BBBW], with a selection of the
CRYPTO 81 papers.]
[WZ] W. K. Wootters and W. H. Zurek, ‘‘A Single Quantum
Cannot be Cloned’’, to appear in Nature. [Publication data:
Nature 299 (5886):802–803 (1982).]
[Y] A. Yao, ‘‘Theory and Applications of Trapdoor Functions’’,
23rd IEEE-FOCS, 80–91 (1982).
9 Decades after these words were written, the basic idea behind this
paper was reinvented independently by Ivan Damga˚rd, Thomas
Pedersen and Louis Salvail, but they worked out the complete
analysis of its security, which is missing here. Fittingly, these two
papers appear together in this special issue of Natural Computing
celebrating 30 years of BB84.
10 We also thank Ilana Frank Mor for typesetting this paper in 2014
from the original 1982 manuscript and for detecting most of the
typographical mistakes that have been corrected here.
458 C. H. Bennett, G. Brassard and S. Breidbart
123
